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Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration

Ptolemaic - Egyptian Collaboration
and the Weak state problem
Alan Clingan (University of Maryland -- College
Park)
Egypt, after its conquest by the Persians in 525 BCE,
appeared as an appendage on the map of the ancient world. After
millennia of near-constant indigenous reign, Egypt’s leader was a
foreigner who did not reside in Egypt. But the end of Alexander’s
empire gave rise to the Greek-speaking Ptolemaic dynasty in 305
BCE, and with it a pharaoh residing in Egypt. The rise of the
Ptolemies is unique among the Macedonian successor states.
The inherent foreignness of the Ptolemies and their court had
to be made presentable to the Egyptian population. Egyptian
bureaucracy survived through both the Persians and Alexander
but had to be controlled and tamed to prevent uprisings and
threats to foreign power. With a pharaoh fully residing in Egypt
this became even more imperative. The Ptolemaic dynasty
had to exercise control through all the levels of administration
down to the local populace, but they had to prevent both the
mostly-Egyptian populace from rising against them and the
Greek settlers who accompanied the Ptolemies. Compromises
were made and the Egyptian populace was amenable to them,
but ultimately forces outside of the Ptolemies’ grasp undid their
strength. Their form of rule, one which worked well for the first
three Ptolemaic pharaohs, inhibited them from being able to
respond effectively when larger crises hit. The early Ptolemaic
administration revolved around a weak state that exercised power
by substantial collaboration with the Egyptians and lower-level
administrators.
PREVIOUS UNDERSTANDINGS
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Previous understandings of the Ptolemaic state emphasized
the role of irresponsible pharaohs. While there is general
consensus that the first few Ptolemies were effective and efficient
rulers, the common explanation for the lackluster performance of
their successors usually given is simple recklessness. Exemplifying
this standard view perfectly, Monica Anemi, a classicist focusing
on North Africa and Egypt, has written, “[after Ptolemy III,]
Succeeding Ptolemies became obsessed with power that they
failed to take responsibility for Egypt and her people. Therefore,
a gradual deterioration of political power and influence became
inevitable.”1 She espouses a division of the Ptolemaic dynasty
into two parts: the old, good Ptolemies versus the young, bad
Ptolemies. The early Ptolemies became upstanding warriorpharaohs while the later Ptolemies were reduced to gluttonous
sloth-pharaohs. This conceptualization runs much deeper and
older within Ptolemaic scholarship than the statement of a single
classicist. In the second century BCE, Polybius described Ptolemy
IV (r. 221-204 BCE) as, “absorbed in unworthy intrigues,
and senseless and continual drunkenness.”2 These descriptors
thus make the collapse of the Ptolemaic dynasty the failings of
individuals.
This interpretation is appealing in its narrative simplicity,
and offers an inspiring story of rebellion against despotic rule.
It paints the Ptolemies as rulers who overstayed their welcome.
Despite hard-working beginnings they were corrupted by power.
Their tyrannical rule oppressed the Egyptian majority. The
Ptolemies overplayed their hand, forcefully disrupting Egypt
to a point where revolution rang in the air. The later rebellions
were the will of the people overthrowing their oppressors. The
rebellions were seen as evidence of the failing Ptolemaic state.
These claims function, however, only under the assumption that
the Ptolemaic state was tyrannical enough to provoke rebellion,
yet not tyrannical enough to suppress rebellion. The evidence
most often used in favor of this view is the revolt immediately after
the Battle of Raphia. Scholars have long assumed that this battle
Penn History Review
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was the first time Egyptian troops were used alongside Greek
troops, a point that will be disproved below. Despite winning the
battle, the Ptolemaic dynasty was rocked by the Great Revolt.
As Polybius wrote, “By arming the Egyptians for his war against
Antiochos, Ptolemy [IV] had an excellent idea for the short time,
but he did not take into account the future. Priding themselves
upon their victory at Raphia, the soldiers were no longer disposed
to obey orders.”3 The Great Revolt was seen as the watershed,
dividing the pre-Raphia good Ptolemies from the post-Raphia
bad Ptolemies. This sentiment continues to be echoed: writing in
2016, Hans Hauben, a historian of the ancient world wrote that
it is important not to “play down the national(istic) factor [of the
post-Raphia rebellion].”4 These interpretations rely on the belief
that the Egyptians were oppressed and, once trained and armed,
took advantage of the opportunity to assail their oppressor. Yet
these explanations ignore the complex realities of political power
which the later Ptolemaic pharaohs faced.
Instead of a tyrannical oppressive state domineering the
Egyptian population until they broke in revolt, it is possible the
Ptolemaic state was not tyrannically oppressive. The rebellions
that threatened the Ptolemaic state were perhaps caused by forces
outside of the control of the Ptolemies rather than instigated by
a decadent Ptolemaic tyrant. It is possible, too, that the difficulty
in suppressing the later rebellions were not due to the scale of
Egyptian hatred for their Ptolemaic overlords, but because
the Ptolemaic state was weak. The older formulations of the
Ptolemaic state hardly considered these possibilities, but when
evaluating the evidence, it becomes clear that the Ptolemaic state
was not an oppressively tyrannical one, whose heavy-handed
actions accidentally instigated rebellions and found itself unable
to suppress them because of their sheer scale. Rather it is evident
that the Ptolemaic state relied on substantial collaboration with
the Egyptians before rebellions instigated by factors outside
their control exposed the fact the Ptolemaic state was weak
because it had over-relied on the Egyptian populace. To prove
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this interpretation it is necessary to evaluate all the interactions
between the Ptolemaic state and the native Egyptians.
PTOLEMAIC-EGYPTIAN COLLABORATION
The Egyptian population assisted the Ptolemaic
administration by enforcing its law. By assisting the
administration, the Egyptians would have gained some agency
over their own lives, yet they did not immediately turn this agency
against the Ptolemies. The most visible members of Ptolemaic
state bureaucracy would have been administrators functioning
as law enforcement. Interestingly, where the majority of the
population was Egyptian, Egyptian law enforcement officers
predominated. Nearly all written records show law enforcement
officers as having Egyptian names.5 These local officers themselves
relied heavily on the population they were overseeing in order
to carry out their tasks. When law enforcement required it, the
local officer would call upon the local populace to help track
down those evading justice and stolen property.6 This utilization
of the local population as the arm of the law under official
sanction by the local officer was rather similar to what later
legal traditions would call a Posse comitatus, or in more common
parlance, a posse. Given the fact that it was necessary to call
upon the populace for enforcing the law, it would be reasonable
to deduce that the Egyptian administration, at least at the local
level, lacked manpower. There existed a wide range of positions
among the local administrators, but each administrator, rather
than being assigned to a narrow purview, was tasked with a wide
range of responsibilities. They supervised projects, conducted
investigations, and assisted in tax collection on top of their
law enforcement duties.7 This broad purview left a substantial
portion of law enforcement work to fall to the citizens. It could
have been problematic to rely on the populace to enforce the law
upon local administrators’ request, as if the Egyptians refused to
assist the administration it would have lost the ability to enforce
Penn History Review
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the law. Yet the system was successful and the native population
worked with the administration in assisting the Ptolemies.
Despite having the means to, the Egyptians did not consistently
oppose the Ptolemaic rule, indicating some level of collaboration
between the two parties.
The Ptolemaic bureaucracy, through its structure,
functioned to ingrain itself within the population. For the
average Egyptian and the lowest administrators, life under the
Ptolemies carried on as it did before. Egyptians were allowed to
retain much of their previous legal structure. Different laws and
legal systems existed for the Greeks and the Egyptian populations
even in 126 BCE.8 Even the language used at the lowest levels
remained Egyptian.9 In Egyptian tradition, the pharaoh was
an active participant in legal matters and the apex of any legal
appeal.10 Decisions made by a lower official could in theory be
appealed up ultimately to the pharaoh. Rules and judgment
were inherently within the powers of pharaoh, even the pharaoh
himself lived within a tightly rule-bound tradition.11 This
continued and expanded under the Ptolemies. Voluminous letters
and petitions flew directly from the populace to the Ptolemies,
the highest reaches of the bureaucracy, or even to any individual
thought by the sender to have some measures of influence. Low
administrators petitioned Ptolemy III (r. 246-222 BCE) for debt
relief.12 Unpaid soldiers wrote to commanders up the chain of
command.13 A tax collector’s Greek assistant received petitions
for the release of a criminal.14 Examples such as these abound
in primary sources. While many of the appeals did not reach
the person to whom they were addressed, the Ptolemies tried to
display themselves as just. Despite Polybius’s claim that Ptolemy
IV was wasteful and given to weakness, he managed to find his
emphasis on justice and mercy commendable.15 This concept that
the pharaoh was always available as a course of appeal, especially
after the rule by the distant Persians, would have given hope to
the average Egyptian and tied them closer to the Ptolemies.
Taxes played a substantial role in Ptolemaic policy towards
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Alan Clingan

Ptolemaic-Egyptian Collaboration

the Egyptian population and proved to be a major point of
collaboration. The system of taxation in Egypt historically relied
on land and routed the payments though the temples up through
the temple bureaucracy to the pharaoh. This taxation structure was
kept intact by the Ptolemies.16 Tax breaks were granted to soldiers
to encourage loyalty, and expressions of mercy and clemency
would often be accompanied by broad temporary lessening of
taxes.17 The temples and priests, as collectors of the taxes, were
exempt from taxes.18 Broad swaths of the population faced
lessened tax burdens in an attempt to gain loyalty.19 Information
about taxes, how much to collect and from whom to collect,
did not come from supreme order of the higher bureaucracy,
but from the lower levels of administration upwards.20 Given
the reluctance of the Ptolemies to utilize Egyptian troops many
foreigners had to be enticed to volunteer in the Ptolemaic military
by promises of substantial pay.21 The ability of the Ptolemies to
grant such large tax exemptions, both periodically to all and in
perpetuity to certain groups, along with the importance taxes
played in hiring the foreign soldiers upon which the Ptolemies
depended on hints at another important source of Ptolemaic
income: plunder. The Ptolemies did not seem keen on worldconquest as Alexander was or on resurrecting Alexander’s empire
as other successor states were, but when in battle, plunder was
often a goal. This was a pattern throughout early Ptolemaic rule.
Ptolemy I’s conquests in Anatolia ended with him selling the
plunder, while Ptolemy IV, after achieving objectives, did not
translate his success in battle into further conquests.22 Plundering
and the lack of desire for conquest mutually go together. After
all, if the king intends on ruling the land, plundering would be
effectively stealing from the king, as Cyrus infamously discovered
in the Siege of Sardis.23 Through plunder, the Ptolemies were
able to lessen the tax burden, thereby gaining loyalty, while
maintaining the army upon which they relied, but this came at
the expense of long-term conquest outside Egypt.24 Perhaps the
Ptolemies never desired long-term conquest outside of Egypt at
Penn History Review
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all, but their policies of emphasis on plunder prevented it even if
they wanted to conquer.25
The temples, as a major cog in the bureaucratic machine,
had to be supported by the Ptolemies. But given the importance
of temples within Egyptian culture, the Ptolemies had to appear
sincere in their actions towards the temples and the temple’s
bureaucracy.26 This they did through actions, performed in
rituals, and words, such as dedications and decrees.27 The temple
priests, beyond their role as temple officials of the Ptolemaic state,
also supplied officers to the Ptolemaic military.28 Around 15% of
Ptolemaic military officers were Egyptian and about 30% of those
directly held priestly offices.29 An unknown number of Ptolemaic
Egyptian military officers had ties to the priestly bureaucracy but
did not directly hold priestly ranks. These figures were determined
through analysis of letters, names, and military burials but both of
these percentages increased as Ptolemaic rule continued.30 Given
the importance of tax collection, which was the domain of the
temple, on the functioning of the military, this tied, in a bottomup fashion, the priestly elites to the Ptolemies. But the co-opting
of the temples also functioned in a top-down method. Ptolemaic
pharaohs from Ptolemy II (r. 283-246 BCE) onward created new
temples, cults, and rituals surrounding members of the Ptolemaic
dynasty.31 Any expansion of the religious infrastructure of Egypt
would have necessitated an expansion in the temple bureaucracy
to maintain the new temples, practice the new cults, and perform
the new rituals. This would have swelled the bureaucratic ranks
of the temple with priests tied to the Ptolemies for the security of
their occupation.
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Relief from Philae depicting Ptolemy I, dressed as an Egyptian
pharaoh, bearing gifts for the Egyptian goddess Hathor. Evident
is the utilization of the Ptolemies of traditional Egyptian symbolism and traditions.
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Key in Ptolemaic policy towards temples was not only
maintenance of native Egyptian religion, but also an active
movement towards reconciling Egyptian and Greek beliefs. The
creation of the god Serapis brings this to light. Serapis was a
combination of the Egyptian bull-god Apis and numerous other
attributes more often associated with Greek divinities.32 Many
attributes of Greek divinities were combined with attributes
of Egyptian divinities. For example, “aspects of the father god
and saviour god Zeus and the underworld god Pluto were also
merged with aspects of the fertility god Dionysos and the healing
god Asklepios” to create an entirely new divinity for both the
Egyptians and Greeks.33 Serapis was promoted, expanding beyond
the popularity of the previous popular bull cult surrounding
Apis, to be seen as a major god among the Egyptians.34 Among
the Greeks in Egypt, Serapis eventually had an additional role
as the husband of Isis, and through that role gained popularity
in the Greek and later Roman worlds.35 This opened up new
temples and cults that needed staffed but also it presented a link
between the Egyptian and Greek subjects. Greek subjects, despite
some reluctance, eventually accepted Serapis and even endowed
new temples for him.36 Through these temples both Greeks and
Egyptians could worship the same god together. Inserting a deity
into both religious traditions was one step towards unification of
the Ptolemies’ Greek and Egyptian populations around a single
identity.
Social mobility existed for those Egyptians who adapted
to Ptolemaic rule. The Ptolemies brought the Greek language
along with them. Greek rapidly supplanted Egyptian as the
language of choice among the highest stratum of Ptolemaic
society. Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the upper
reaches of the bureaucracy.37 The Ptolemaic dynasty themselves
were a bastion of Greek identity, out of twenty-two pharaohs only
one, Cleopatra VII, the Cleopatra known for her escapades with
Caesar and Anthony, learned Egyptian.38 The lack of effort on
part of the Greeks to reach down is understandable as they mostly
Penn History Review
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constituted members of the upper or upper-middle classes. But
while the Greeks did not reach down, the Egyptians could reach
up.39 Learning Greek would give an Egyptian in the Ptolemaic
state a chance for promotion and many Egyptians who learnt
Greek adopted Greek names. Within one family of notaries in
Pathyris, the earlier generations used Egyptian names while later
generations used Greek names, despite the fact their knowledge
of Greek was limited.40 Knowledge of Greek, as evident by that
example, did not always indicate Greek ethnicity.41 This adoption
of Greek names has led to continued confusion regarding the
exact nature of the upper reaches of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy,
where Greek names predominate.42 While it certainly may be true
that the upper echelons of the Ptolemaic bureaucracy remained
predominately Greek, the very fact that some Egyptians, by
adopting Greek, were able to rise in the bureaucracy would have
given a sense of agency and social mobility to the low-ranking civil
servant. But social mobility could also instigate also nationalist
sentiment among these and other rising middle-class Egyptians.
The Ptolemies actively used their founder’s connection
with Alexander the Great to make a claim that Egypt was the
successor to the Alexandrian empire. From the beginning of
Ptolemaic rule there was an emphasis placed on connecting
the Egyptians to Alexander, and by extension to the Ptolemies.
The capture of Alexander’s body by Ptolemy I and its burial in
Alexandria can be seen in this light.43 If the Egyptians could be
made to feel as if they were part of Alexander’s empire, then the
threat that they would rebel against the Ptolemies, a dynasty
continually emphasizing its ties to Alexander, would be reduced.
Even Ptolemy I’s original claim only to the title of satrap aligns
with this reconfiguration of history.44 Egypt was portrayed as the
Alexandrian empire, the Ptolemies were portrayed as simply the
successors to Alexander, and Alexander himself was portrayed as
an Egyptian. Also promoted was the myth of Sesostris, a warrior
pharaoh who supposedly conquered Europe. The Sesostris myth
was “used to console the national pride of the Egyptians [after]
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a series of foreign conquests, [and it was] evidently intended to
buttress their sagging national self-confidence and…national
identity.”45 The myth is a reversal of Alexander’s conquests and
by extension the Ptolemies’, but it emphasizes Egypt as the
conqueror. Not only was Egypt Alexander’s empire, or what
remained of it, but Egypt was portrayed as having a long history
of conquering other peoples, including conquering Thrace and
Scythia, two places quite close to Greece and Macedonia.46 This
repainting of history to emphasize Egypt was, in effect, controlled
nationalism by the Ptolemies. Since Egypt conquered Greece and
Macedonia, or at least conquered peoples near such places, then
the foreignness of the ruling stratum was not actually so foreign.
By utilizing Egyptian nationalism and contorting it to suit their
purposes the Ptolemies were able to strengthen their own reign.
The Ptolemies tried to deemphasize ethnic differences
between the Egyptians and the Greeks. It would be wrong to
assert that Ptolemaic Egypt treated their Greek and Egyptian
subjects equally, but the racialized distinctions between Egyptian
and Greek were propagated by Greek immigrants. Ptolemaic
Egypt was, in some regards, seen as a promised land by many
Greeks, leading to Greek immigration into Egypt.47 Seeing
the Greek settlers as colonists helps make light of the Greek
racialization of the Egyptians, as the Greek settlers perpetuated
a viewpoint reminiscent of colonialism in later millennia: the
settlers in colonies tended to hold racist beliefs towards the natives
in contrast to the patronizing but less racist beliefs espoused by
the metropole and the central government. Given the extent the
Ptolemies tried to collaborate with the Egyptian population, it
seems doubtful the Ptolemies would have encouraged the racial
divisions between the Greeks and Egyptians.48 Drawing racial
distinctions between the Greeks and Egyptians would have
worked against the Ptolemies and their need for a collaborative
state with the Egyptians. Even as the Ptolemaic state suffered
from uprisings from the reign of Ptolemy IV onward, the
performance of the Ptolemaic ruler as a traditional Egyptian
Penn History Review
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pharaoh continued.49 If the Ptolemies had actively racialized
the Egyptians it would have been logical for them to abandon
the imagery of an Egyptian pharaoh. Yet this did not happen.
Understanding the racialization of the Egyptians as being led by
Greek settlers as opposed to the Ptolemaic administration solves
this conundrum.

A coin of the unlucky Ptolemy IV, a ruler who faced the
first of many major uprisings which the Ptolemaic state
were unable to suppress.

EXPLAINING THE FALL
Despite all these attempts and quite substantial
collaboration and buy-in from the local population, Egyptian
uprisings occurred. While the early Ptolemies faced no serious
rebellions, this slowly changed.50 By the time of Ptolemy IV, who
reigned between 221 and 204 B.C.E., the first uprising broke
out.51 These rebellions became more common and more difficult to
suppress as Ptolemaic rule plodded on.52 But these uprisings were
closely related to environmental shocks, not directly by Ptolemaic
policies.53 When volcanic eruptions caused fluctuations in Nile
flooding or other environmental pressures, depending on the
severity of the disruptions, rebellions often occurred. Eruptions
around 246 BCE coincide with the recall of the recently crowned
Ptolemy III from battle to Egypt to deal with revolts.54 Even the
uprising by the newly-armed Egyptian troops after the Battle of
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Raphia coincided directly with a disruption in the usual flow
of the Nile caused by environmental fluctuations.55 While the
role of phalanx-trained Egyptian troops in the uprising should
not be underestimated, the fact the uprising corresponded with
environmental changes hints at a connection. The Theban revolt
of southern Egypt starting in 206 B.C.E. also aligned well with
Nile fluctuations caused by volcanic activity.56 These and other
examples of rebellions coinciding with environmental changes
are too numerous to be ignored. However, rebellions caused
ultimately by environmental changes were not new in Egypt.
The history of Egypt prior to the arrival of the Ptolemies was
littered with similar examples.57 Yet since these uprisings were a
continual occurrence throughout Egyptian history, the inability
of the Ptolemies to successfully put down these rebellions is
notable and hints at deeper trouble underpinning Ptolemaic rule.
The Ptolemaic state was weak. Collaboration with the
native Egyptian population might have made Egypt easier to
reign for the Ptolemies, but presented a problem when those
Egyptians, upon whom the Ptolemies relied, rebelled. Co-opting
the symbols, rituals, and practices of Egypt could not insulate the
Ptolemies from what was endemic in Egypt, uprisings caused by
environmental events. A strong centralized state would have been
needed to deal with the uprisings environmental fluctuations
brought, but a collaborationist state cannot be centralized.
Collaboration requires the lower-level administrators to have
significant autonomy and necessitates that the upper levels rely
on the lower levels. This fundamentally undercut the Ptolemaic
dynasty’s ability to exert control when uprisings occurred.
Between Scylla and Charybdis, the Ptolemies had to either create
a centralized state and risk continual uprisings immediately or
create a collaborationist state and risk periodic uprisings due to
factors outside their control. Given the choice they chose the
latter. Through a weak state they founded their rule; through a
weak state they lost their rule.
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CONCLUSION
The Ptolemaic state was centered on collaboration with
the native population and Ptolemaic law was enforced by a
broad swath of the Egyptian populace. The taxes were collected
by Egyptians. Temples, supported by the Ptolemies, employed
Egyptians and were a substantial presence in the lives of an
average Egyptian. Opportunities for advancement existed to
skillful Egyptians who adapted to their new Ptolemaic rulers.
Myths told to Egyptians granted them nationalism and pride in
their own agency. Ethnic and racial identifications were inherent,
but were not promoted by the Ptolemies. Structures such as the
ability to appeal legal cases, tax relief, support for the temples,
possibilities for advancement, and the promotion of nationalism
all worked to tie the people closer to the Ptolemaic state. But the
features of the Ptolemaic state that allowed it to thrive, such as
substantial collaboration with the Egyptian population within a
decentralized administration, proved a weakness. Ultimately, the
Egyptians did not rise in revolt because of what the Ptolemies
did; rather, they rose because of what the Ptolemies could not
control. Uprisings caused by environmental fluctuations were
common throughout Egyptian history, but the decentralized
and inherently weak collaborationist state of the Ptolemies made
it unable to effectively respond to them. Collaboration and
decentralization allowed the Ptolemies to rule without provoking
uprisings, but factors outside of their control caused uprisings
anyways. Through the collaborationist and decentralized state
structures, albeit tolerant and empowering to the populace in
normal times, the Ptolemies ultimately discovered the weakness
in their reign.
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